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A new method to estimate the risk of financial intermediaries 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we reconsider the formal estimation of the risk of financial intermediaries. 
Risk is modeled as the variability of the profit function of a representative intermediary, 
here bank, as formally considered in finance theory. In turn, banking theory suggests that 
risk is determined simultaneously with profits and other bank- and industry-level 
characteristics that cannot be considered predetermined when profit maximizing 
decisions of financial institutions are to be made. Thus, risk is endogenous. We estimate 
the model on a panel of US banks, spanning the period 1985q1-2010q2. The findings 
suggest that risk was fairly stable up to 2001 and accelerated quickly thereafter and up to 
2007. Indices of bank risk commonly used in the literature do not capture this trend 
and/or the scale of the increase.  
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis that erupted in 2007 turned the spotlight on financial institutions and 
their management of the risks they face. A fundamental and timely question is how the total 
(solvency) risk of a financial intermediary should be measured. In this paper, we propose a new 
method to estimate this risk, using the profit function and the implications of standard economic 
and banking theory. The model is quite general and, in fact, applies to all firms. An important 
element in our framework is that risk is endogenous to internal factors, such as managerial 
decisions, and external factors, such as the macroeconomic environment. This novelty is 
essential because, in the literature, measurement of the risk of financial institutions is usually 
based on accounting ratios that cannot capture this type of simultaneity, nor do they seem to 
capture the level of risk and its upward trend during the 2000s. 
Building on economic theory, we use the implications of the portfolio selection models 
developed by Markowitz (1952) and Roy (1952), and extended by many others, where the 
estimates of the simple variance of profits, or the downside variance, can be used to measure 
risk. In particular, this theory suggests that if an overall measure of risk is sought in the context 
of expected utility, that measure should be related to the variability of profits or the variability of 
factors determining the profit function. In this literature, such measures are employed primarily 
to model asset prices and portfolio value. Here we use the profit function to describe the 
technology of financial institutions in the context of duality theory.  
We augment this framework with the implications of intermediation (banking) theory, 
which suggests that risk decisions of financial intermediaries are simultaneously made with 
perceptions on expected profits and, in addition, are affected by certain characteristics of a 
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bank’s balance sheet and the state of the economic environment.1
 The new method is quite general and can, in fact, be applied to any firm. Here, we focus 
on financial institutions and, in particular banks, because of the clear implications of banking 
theory concerning the endogeneity discussed above, the important developments in the banking 
sector before and after the subprime crisis and the key role banks play in the real and the 
monetary economic spectrum. One important concern for our modeling choice was not to impose 
more stringent data requirements on the researcher.     
 This simultaneity calls for a 
class of models, where risk is jointly determined along with (i) other decisions of the financial 
institutions (e.g. concerning the level of capitalization and/or liquidity) and (ii) the 
macroeconomic environment. To this end, the variability of profits should be endogenous to 
profits themselves and potentially to other bank-level variables or the structural and 
macroeconomic conditions. Therefore, an important advantage of the approach presented here is 
that technology, risk, bank decisions and structural and macroeconomic conditions can be 
modeled jointly.  
The model is applied to a large panel of US banks that covers the period 1985q2-2010q1. 
The results indicate that bank risk was relatively stable up to 2001 and gradually increased by 
more than 200%, since then. This pattern is robust, irrespective of the functional form used to 
estimate the profit function and the variables included to tackle simultaneity. Thus, the new 
measure captures the buildup of bank risk way before the eruption of the financial turmoil in 
2007. In this respect, and besides having a clear theoretical basis, the new measure represents a 
better alternative to measures widely employed in banking studies to measure risk that, as we 
                                                 
1 This is recognized by Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Diamond and Rajan (2000), Dangl and Zechner (2004), Berger 
and Bouwman (2009), Flannery and Rangan (2008), Freixas and Rochet (2008), Degryse et al. (2009), among many 
others. 
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show below, do not seem to capture the buildup of risk during the 2000s and/or its substantial 
increase.    
The rest of the paper proceeds along the following lines. Section 2 presents the formal 
econometric model. Section 3 discusses the application to the US banking sector and presents the 
empirical findings. Section 4 concludes the paper and offers some ideas for potential extensions.   
 
2. The model       
A quite important problem faced by the empirical researcher in estimating technology 
functions of financial intermediaries is that risk should be endogenously determined. The 
banking theory behind this issue is straightforward. The level of risk is set by bank managers in a 
way that encompasses information about the level of expected profits, the level of capital and 
liquidity that banks hold and the state of the regulatory and macroeconomic environment. 
Therefore, one cannot suggest that risk determines stricto sensu current bank profits. In fact, the 
perceived optimal level of bank risk is simultaneously determined with current profits, also 
taking into account other endogenous and predetermined variables. This modeling choice, even 
though fundamental for the robust estimation of the risk of financial intermediaries, is absent in 
the empirical literature.  
Here, we present a model that uses the profit function to estimate endogenous bank 
profits. We model a representative bank but, this model may, in fact, be applied in its general 
form to any firm. Bank risk depends on certain endogenous variables and it is itself considered to 
be endogenous in the profit function. The rest of the endogenous variables are determined in the 
context of a simultaneous equation model and also depend on profits as well as risk. Therefore, 
the model is, in fact, very general as it considers all potential types of endogeneity. 
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We consider a restricted normalized profit function of the form: 
1 1 2i i i i iy x z vβ β σ′ ′= + + , for 1,...,i N= ,      (1) 
where iy  represents profit of bank i, 1ix  is a standard 1 1k ×  vector of covariates in the profit 
function, iz  is a 1G×  vector of endogenous variables, ( )~ 0,1
iid
iv N  is the error term, and 
2
iσ  is 
the variance of profits to be estimated. Following the portfolio selection theory, we consider the 
estimates of profit variability as a formal measure of risk.2
Assume the following additional specification for the variance of the profit function: 
  
2 ( , ),i if zσ γ=           (2) 
where iz  is a 1G×  vector of variables that determines the risk of banks, γ  is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated and ( , )if z γ  is a functional form differentiable in iz . For example, f 
can take the form 2i izσ γ′=  or 
2 exp( )i izσ γ′= , etc. Note that, despite the fact that we use a “cross-
sectional notation”, panel data models of the form ( )2 2 2, 1 ,, ,..., ;it it i t i t Lf zσ σ σ γ− −=  are fully nested 
within our general specification in Eq. (2).3 iy The dependence on  will be discussed below. 
Up to this stage, we formally identify risk with the variability of profits and explain this 
variability in terms of a vector of variables in iz . If these variables were predetermined or 
exogenous, estimation of the profit function in (1) subject to (2) would be straightforward using 
the method of maximum likelihood. Unfortunately, this is a very strong assumption for financial 
institutions’ risk-setting behavior, since the iz s represent firm (bank) characteristics that are 
simultaneously determined with the level of risk in the following way: 
2
2( , , )i i i iz f x y σ= .         (3) 
                                                 
2 Of course, after estimation one could consider only the downside variance of profits as a measure of bank risk. 
3 This also includes the formal possibility of fixed effects in (1) and (2). 
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For example, bank managers set the optimal level of risk given the levels of capitalization, 
liquidity, etc, which are naturally included in z. This simultaneity of the iz s with bank risk is a 
notorious element in the banking literature and should be accounted for in any attempt to 
estimate risk robustly. Further, risk and other characteristics of bank balance sheets are heavily 
affected by the regulatory or macroeconomic conditions prevailing at each point in time. 
Therefore, these elements might also be included in z. Thorough discussions of these issues can 
be found in the literature cited in footnote 1. 
To account for this endogeneity, assume the following general simultaneous equation 
model: 
( ) ( )22 1 1 2 2i i i i iz x y uϕ λ ϕ σ λΓ = Β + + + , ( )~ 0,
iid
iu N Σ ,                         (4) 
where 2ix  is a 2 1k ×  vector of explanatory variables, which can include 1ix . Here, 1ϕ  and 2ϕ  are 
known univariate differentiable functions (for example ( )j w wϕ =  or ( ) logj w wϕ = , 1, 2j = ), 
1λ , 2λ  are 1G×  vectors of coefficients, and Γ  and Β  are G G×  and 2G k× , respectively. Of 
course, restrictions are assumed in place for Γ  and Β  in view of identification. For example, the 
diagonal elements of Γ  are assumed to be equal to 1 and this matrix must be nonsingular. 
Moreover, the variance 2iσ  may depend also on 2ix .
4
  For simplicity, we can write 
 
( ) ( )2 * *2 1 1 2 2 2i i i i i i iz x y u x uϕ λ ϕ σ λΓ = Β + + + ≡ Β + . To begin 
with, we assume ( )1 2 10 Gλ λ ×= = . Then 
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1/ 2 1 1 22
2| 2 exp 2
i i i
i i i
i
y x z
p y z
β β
πσ
πσ
−  ′ ′− −
= − 
  
     (5) 
                                                 
4 The variance may also depend on yi. The Jacobian of transformation from vi to yi can be formally computed. This 
possibility has been recognized before by Rigobon (2003). 
 8 
and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )/ 2 1/ 2 * * 1 * *1 2 222 expGi i i i ip z z x z xπ − − − ′= Σ Γ − Γ −Β Σ Γ −Β     (6) 
Therefore, the joint distribution of the observed endogenous variables is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1 2
2
( 1) / 2 1/ 21/ 2 1
* * 1 * *1
2 22
; .
.
, 2 exp
2 ;
exp
i
G i ii
i i
i
i ii i
x z
y f z
z
x x
y
p z
f
z z
γ
β β
π
π γ
− + −−
−
 
  ⋅
 
 
 
⋅ Σ 
 
′ ′− −
= − Σ
′Γ − Γ −Β Γ −Β
  (7) 
This likelihood function can be maximized using standard numerical techniques. Formal 
concentration with respect to parameters *Β  and Σ  is also possible so the problem can be 
simplified in terms of maximizing the log-likelihood function of the sample.5
In the general case, where 
 
1 2, 0λ λ ≠ , the formulation of ( )|i ip y z  is straightforward but, 
the formulation of the inverse distribution ( )|i ip z y  or ( )ip z  is not trivial. The Jacobian of 
transformation is given by  
( )
( ) ( )
( )/ 2
2 2 1 1 2
, ;
;
,
Gi i i
i i
i i i
v u f z
D f z
y z z
γ
γ ϕ λ ϕ λ β−
∂ ∂
′ ′ ′= = Γ − −
′∂ ∂
,                            (8) 
after accounting for the fact that the variance depends itself on endogenous variables (the iz s). If 
2
i izσ γ′= , then 
( );i
i
f z
z
γ
γ
∂
′=
′∂
. If ( )2 expi izσ γ′= , then 
( ) ( )
;
expi i
i
f z
z
z
γ
γ γ
∂
′ ′=
′∂
.  
In this case, we have 
                                                 
5 The details are available on request from the authors. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
( 1) / 2 / 2 1 1
1/ 2 * * 1 * *1
2 2 1 1 2 2 22
2, 2 ; exp
2 ;
;
exp .
G G i i i
i i i
i
i
i i i i
i
y x z
p y z f z
f z
f z
z x z x
z
β β
π γ
π γ
γ
ϕ λ ϕ λ β
− + −
− −
 ′ ′− −
 = −
  
∂  ′′ ′ ′Σ ⋅ Γ − − ⋅ − Γ −Β Σ Γ −Β ′∂  
⋅
  (9) 
The simplest case is when ( ) ( )1 2w w wϕ ϕ= = ,6 ( );i if z zγ γ′= and . In this case the 
Jacobian term is simply 2 1 2λ γ λ β′ ′Γ − − , where 2λ γ ′  and 1 2λ β ′  are rank-one G G×  matrices. Of 
course, if 1λ  or 2λ  (or possibly both) are zero, further simplifications arise. The typical case is to 
have profits, iy , and the variance, 
2
iσ , appearing as determinants of the iz s. Part of the reason 
may be that not all banks have positive profits so that we cannot consider the log of iy . 
However, one may have ( )2 logw wϕ = , with ( ) 12 w wϕ −′ = . In that case, the Jacobian would be 
 ( ) ( )1 2 1 2
;; i
i
i i
f
z
zD f z γγ λ λ β− ∂
′∂
′= Γ − − .                                              (10) 
In terms of our model, it is instructive to provide a simple example to show that risk can 
also be a function of profits ( iy ). Indeed, consider for simplicity the following “mean-scale” 
model ( )i i iy y vµ σ= + , where ( )~ 0,1
iid
iv N . Apparently, the Jacobian of transformation is 
 
( ) ( )( )
( )2
y y yv
y y
σ σ µ
σ
′− −∂
=
∂         (11) 
and the density of y  would be 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
2
1/ 2
2 22 exp 2
y y y y
p y
y y
µ σ σ µ
π
σ σ
−   ′− − −
= − ⋅ 
  
.    (12) 
                                                 
6 One may think that specifying φ2(w) = log(w) is better, since variances are restricted to being positive. This is, of 
course, correct. However, a large part of the literature on GARCH models simply ignores this constraint and adopts 
the assumption φ2(w) = w, using parametric restrictions (on γ) to ensure positive variances.  
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The Jacobian is nonzero, provided ( )yσ  is not a solution of the difference equation 
( ) ( )( ) 0y y yσ σ µ′− − = , that is ( )2yσ  should not be equal to ( )2C y µ− , where C is a 
constant. Other specifications for the variance term would be acceptable, for example 
( ) ( )2 21 2y C C yσ µ= + − , 1 0C > . This shows that, in terms of our model, risk can be a function 
of profits ( iy ) themselves, despite the fact that profits are also determined by risk. In that sense, 
we allow for joint determination of risk and profits.7
Suppose, indeed, that 
  
2
i i iz yσ γ α′= + . Then, relative to (8), the only difference is that the 
Jacobian term is ( )2 2 1 1 2 2 2ϕ λ γ ϕ λ αϕ λ β′ ′ ′ ′ ′Γ − − + . If 2 0λ = , the new formulation does not add 
anything to the Jacobian, otherwise, the contribution depends on ( ), ;i i
i
f z y
y
γ
α
∂
=
∂
. 
  
3. Empirical application to the US banking sector 
3.1. Data and empirical setup 
Since the recent crisis originated in the USA, focusing on the US banking sector is a natural 
choice for a contemporary case study of bank risk. The idea here is to develop the new metric 
without imposing more stringent data requirements compared to the usual empirical research 
paper. A quick look in the literature will reveal that the most widely used database for studies of 
the US banking system is the one from the FDIC Call reports.  
We build an unbalanced dataset that includes information for commercial banks over the 
period 1985q1-2010q2. We start from the complete sample of banks in the Call reports, but we 
                                                 
7 This is different from a GARCH-M type model, where the lagged variance, typically, enters into the mean 
equation. Here, the current variance can also enter the mean equation, provided that a proper adjustment for the 
Jacobian term is made. This point seems to be unpublished, at least, to our knowledge.  
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apply two selection criteria. First, we delete all observations for which data on any of the 
variables used in our study are missing. Second, we apply an outlier rule to the variables used, 
corresponding to the 1st and 99th percentiles of the distributions of the respective variables. This 
deletes extreme values that may drive the results. The final sample consists of 814,253 bank-
quarter observations.  
We estimate the system of Eqs. (1), (2) and (3), using both a log-linear and a translog 
specification. Following the paradigm of Humphrey and Pulley (1997) and Koetter et al. (2011), 
we use an alternative profit function that models profits as a function of outputs and input prices. 
We provide formal definitions for the variables used to estimate the profit function in Table 1 
and summary statistics in Table 2. To define outputs and inputs we follow the intermediation 
approach.8 As profits contain both positive and negative values, taking logs of profits becomes 
an issue. We, primarily, use the approach of Bos and Koetter (2011), who left-censor y and 
construct a negative profit indicator variable, say y1, as an additional right-hand side variable.9
As discussed above, we assume that the variance of profits (risk) is endogenous to profits 
themselves and other bank or industry characteristics. Bank characteristics used as z are the basic 
equity capital ratio (total equity capital to total assets) and/or a liquidity ratio (liquid assets to 
total assets). Therefore, we assume that banks make risk decisions simultaneously with the levels 
 
                                                 
8 We impose linear homogeneity by dividing profits and input prices by w3. One could include securities and non-
interest income or off-balance sheet items as outputs. This would reduce the time frame of the analysis from 1997 
onwards. Changes in average values of estimated risk are not larger than 5%, thus, we choose to use the full sample 
period. 
9 For banks that exhibit positive profits, y1=1 and for banks that exhibit negative profits, y1=absolute value of these 
negative profits. The left hand side variable, y equals the true value of y for positive profits, and y=1 for negative 
profits. Following relevant literature, we also carry out sensitivity analysis by (i) using only positive profits and (ii) 
adding up the maximum negative profits observed in our sample to all banks plus 1 (to make an index of only 
positive profits). We report the results from the method of Bos and Koetter (2011) but, the rest are available on 
request. 
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of capitalization and/or liquidity in their balance sheets.10 Besides z, in all models, risk is 
endogenously determined by inst1, the first lags of pre1 and pre2 and profits, themselves. 
Further, banks might decide upon their level of risk, given changes in the macroeconomic 
environment. Therefore, we also use the three month T-bill rate and the industrial production 
index as determinants of bank risk. Both these macroeconomic variables enter Eq. (2), lagged 
once to allow information to reach the market and, therefore, we consider them to be 
predetermined variables.11
To identify z, we assume that capital and liquidity ratios also depend on inst1 and the 
fourth lag of inst2. This is a reasonable assumption in the literature of the determinants of bank 
capital and liquidity (e.g., Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Including 
other determinants of z is plausible and in specification (4) we also use the macroeconomic 
variables; however, since identification is achieved, including more variables as determinants of 
z is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
  
 
3.2. Empirical results 
Table 3 reports estimation results for the main determinants of the risk equation, which show 
very good fit. The results on the rest of the coefficients are available on request. We report the 
results for four specifications. The first two are log linear specifications and the last two are 
translog specifications.  
                                                 
10 To motivate this, consider two banks with similar initial risk levels but, different levels of capitalization or 
liquidity. Now if e.g. an exogenous shock hits the banking sector, the more liquid or capitalized bank will be able to 
buffer risk more easily, while the less liquid or less-capitalized bank will have to re-determine its risky position to a 
greater extent. Many other similar arguments can be found in Freixas and Rochet (2008) and Degryse et al. (2009). 
11 One can, very easily, experiment with many other predetermined variables to be included in Eq. (2) and examine 
the sensitivity of the results. We experimented with some regulatory dummies, characterizing major regulatory 
events, with institutional variables, etc. The main results are unaffected. Thus, because our main effort here is to 
measure risk and not analyze an exhaustive list of its determinants, we decided to keep the empirical framework as 
simple as possible.  
 13 
The results of interest are those on the variance of the profit function, which in our model 
represents individual bank risk. In Figure 1, we plot the quarterly average of the bank-quarter 
values of risk (log of variance) obtained from the four specifications.12
In fact, we identify only two different patterns of risk through time. The first, which is 
quantitatively less important, comes from the specification with liquidity as z (line 2 on Figure 1) 
instead of equity capital (line 1). The specification with liquidity shows that risk reached its 
maximum as soon as early 2005 and remained at very high levels until the end of our sample 
period. In contrast, line 1 shows that risk was increasing up until 2009. If we add both z1 and z2 
into the same model, the results are very close to those reflected by line 2. Also, the specification 
with z2 shows a higher value of risk. This pattern is explained by the presence of capital 
requirements in the US banking sector as early as 1989. The capital requirement does not allow 
bank capital to fluctuate as much as liquidity, which is subject to only limited regulation. 
Therefore, bank liquidity is, probably, a more important factor in determining bank risk and is 
the one used in the rest of the specifications reported in Table 3.
 All models capture the 
increase in bank risk that took place in the 2000s. Irrespective of the functional form used, or 
whether we specify z1 or z2 as endogenous, bank risk was fairly stable until 2001 and increased 
more than 200%, thereafter. This pattern is robust to the inclusion of equity capital or a time 
trend also inside Eq. (1), and alternative determinants of z1 or z2 in Eq. (3).  
13
The second difference comes from using a translog specification, as opposed to a log-
linear one. The flexibility of the translog profit function captures a decline in the variability of 
profits after the eruption of the crisis in 2007 (see lines 3 and 4). This looks sensible, as banks 
 
                                                 
12 One could in fact estimate bootstrap confidence intervals for the values reported in Figure 1. These are available 
on request.   
13 An alternative would be to use the distance of equity capital from the minimum requirement. When doing so, the 
results are, indeed, closer to those with the use of the liquidity ratio.  
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started lowering their exposure to very risky assets, as soon as they could, after the eruption of 
the crisis, while prudential regulation became tighter with an increased number of inspection 
audits and sanctions. However, we should note that risk remains quite high, compared to the 
period before 2001. Given the above evidence, we favor the translog specification.  
The value of the new method proves quite significant if one compares the results to 
indices of bank risk, widely used in the relevant empirical literature. In Figure 2 we report four 
such indices, namely (i) the ratio of risky assets to total assets (ra), (ii) the z-index defined as 
(inst2+z1)/σ(inst2) and using a 12 quarter window to calculate the variance, (iii) the ratio of loan 
loss provisions to total loans (llp) and (iv) the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (npl). 
We graph both the industry and bank average by quarter (see the figure’s legend for a definition). 
Evidently, the first two measures cannot capture the extent of the increase in bank risk, while the 
requirement for the z-index to include information from the past might bias the true level of 
current risk. In addition, to calculate the variance for the z-index one needs to trim the sample, 
which might be important in e.g. studies using annual data. The last two indices seem to 
completely fail to capture the upward trend of risk prior to 2007 and, in fact, the bank-level 
averages (which are the ones employed in bank panel data studies and are denoted by the dashed 
lines) completely fail to even capture a significant increase in bank risk. Further, in Table 4 we 
report simple correlation coefficients between the values of the four newly constructed indices 
(r1 to r4) and the four existing indices (ra, z-index, llp, npl). Evidently, correlation coefficients 
between the newly constructed indices and the existing ones are very low. We attribute the 
limitations of existing indices to the fact that they do not follow standard economic theory (with 
the exception of z-index), to the fact that they reflect a static picture of accounting data and to 
their inability to account for the endogeneity/simultaneity issue.  
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4. Conclusions 
This study proposes a new method for the estimation of the risk of financial institutions, 
which is very general and can be applied to any firm. Two important features of the model are 
that it is based on standard economic theory and that risk is endogenously determined with 
certain characteristics of the intermediary and with the macroeconomic environment. Unlike 
measures of risk, widely used in the empirical literature, the new method captures the perceived 
increase of bank risk after 2001 and shows that this increase was gradual and higher than 200%. 
This comparison renders the results of previous literature on bank risk, and its determinants, 
questionable. 
The results of the model could be very easily used to calculate downside variance or look 
at the standard deviation of expected profits in a fashion similar to the Sharpe ratio. Another 
natural extension to this paper is to use the model for the estimation of risk of other types of 
firms or financial intermediaries. On the econometric front, the determination of stochastic risk 
through a CARCH-type process for the variance seems, also, a reasonable extension. We leave 
these for future research. 
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Table1  
Definitions of variables  
Variable Symbol  Measure 
Bank profits y Total profits before tax ($US) 
Output 1  o1 Commercial and industrial loans ($US) 
Output 2  o2 Loans to individuals ($US) 
Output 3 o3 Loans secured by real estate ($US) 
Output 4 o4 Other loans ($US) 
Input price 1 w1 Salary expenses/ total assets 
Input price 2 w2 Interest expenses/ total deposits 
Input price 3 w3 Expenses on fixed assets/total fixed assets 
Endogenous variable 1 z1 Equity capital/ total assets 
Endogenous variable 2 z2 Liquid assets/ total assets 
Predetermined variable 1 pre1 3-month T-bill rate (in %) 
Predetermined variable 2 pre2 US industrial production index 
Instrument 1 inst1 Bank size calculated as the natural log of total assets 
Instrument 2 inst2 Bank profitability calculated as profits before tax/ 
total assets 
Notes: Variables y, o1, o2, o3, o4 and inst1 are in real terms. 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
y 5,395.9 121,227.6 -1.81e+07 2.30e+07 
o1 70,340.8 1,143,058 1 1.42e+08 
o2 42,828.3 761,145.9 1 9.43e+07 
o3 178,448.6 3,168,042 1 4.75e+08 
o4 33,906.3 798,096.5 1 8.88e+07 
w1 0.0099 0.0053 0.0017 0.0325 
w2 0.0248 0.0147 0.0027668 0.0733 
w3 0.0027 0.0018 0.000198 0.0119 
z1 0.0960 0.0298 0.032091 0.4600 
z2 0.9410 0.0446 0.5944798 0.9978 
pre1 4.543 2.058 0.070 8.533 
pre2 75.525 14.622 54.706 100.44 
inst1 11.289 1.298 8.501 21.293 
inst2 0.0084 0.0071 -0.0356 0.0312 
Notes: Variables are defined in Table 1. y, o1, o2, o3 and 
o4are in $US. Number of observations equals 814,253 for all 
variables.  
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Table 3 
Estimation results on the main determinants of risk 
Equation: (1) 
Risk endogenous 
to z1 
(2) 
Risk endogenous 
to z2 
(3) 
Risk endogenous 
to z2 
(4) 
Risk endogenous 
to z2 
Functional form: Log-linear Log-linear Translog Translog 
Risk equation     
inst1 -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.189*** -0.151*** 
 (-15.98) (-16.15) (-74.95) (-55.27) 
lag of pre1 -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.130*** -0.121*** 
 (-13.09) (-13.81) (-46.11) (-46.30) 
lag of pre2 -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.187*** -0.172*** 
 (-19.40) (-20.50) (-46.37) (-43.70) 
z1 0.273***    
 (22.16)    
z2  0.379*** 0.278*** 0.255*** 
  (61.15) (59.33) (48.89) 
Notes: The table reports estimation results (coefficients and t-statistics) for Equation (2) obtained 
from the joint estimation of equations (1), (2) and the equation on z, using maximum likelihood. We 
use 814,253 bank-quarter observations, covering the period 1985q1-2010q2. Variables are defined in 
Table 1. In all regressions, risk is endogenous to profits and to z1 or z2 as specified on the top of the 
table. In specifications (1) to (3) the endogenous variables z1 and z2 are identified using inst1 and 
lagged inst2. In specification (4) lagged pre1 and lagged pre2 also identify z2.   
         
 
 
Table 4 
Correlation matrix between indices of bank risk 
 r1 r2 r3 r4 ra z-index llp npl 
r1 1.000        
r2 0.900 1.000       
r3 0.559 0.671 1.000      
r4 0.594 0.715 0.993 1.000     
ra 0.031 0.025 0.015 0.017 1.000    
z-index -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.146 1.000   
llp -0.027 -0.021 -0.012 -0.013 -0.070 0.043 1.000  
npl -0.054 -0.041 -0.026 -0.028 -0.095 -0.061 0.098 1.000 
Notes: The table presents simple correlation coefficients between the four indices of bank risk 
constructed using the equivalent specifications of Table 3 (denoted as r1 to r4) and the bank level 
values of the indices of bank risk shown in figure 2 (ra is risky assets to total assets, llp is loan loss 
provisions to total loans, npl is non-performing loans to total loans). 
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Figure 1 
Evolution of bank risk (log of variance) over the period 1985q1-2010q2 
 
 
Notes: The figure presents the quarterly average of the bank-quarter values of risk as obtained from the specifications (1)-(4) presented in Table 3. 
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Figure 2 
Evolution of bank risk indices commonly found in the banking literature over the period 1985q1-2010q2 
 
 (b) Risky assets (risky assets/total assets)            (e) z-index = (ROA+EA)/σ(ROA) 
   
 
(c) Credit risk (loan loss provisions/total loans)          (d) Credit risk (problem loans/total loans) 
   
 
Notes: For figures (a) industry average is (total industry risky assets at quarter t)/(total industry assets at quarter t). 
Average by bank is calculated as the ratio of average risky assets to assets for all banks at time t. The same 
definition of industry vs. bank average applies to all other measures. 
